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Abstract. As billions of personal data such as photos are shared through
social media and network, the privacy and security of data have drawn
an increasing attention. Several attempts have been made to alleviate
the leakage of identity information with the aid of image obfuscation
techniques. However, most of the present results are either perceptu-
ally unsatisfactory or ineffective against real-world recognition systems.
In this paper, we argue that an algorithm for privacy protection must
block the ability of automatic inference of the identity and at the same
time, make the resultant image natural from the users’ point of view. To
achieve this, we propose a targeted identity-protection iterative method
(TIP-IM), which can generate natural face images by adding adversarial
identity masks to conceal ones’ identity against a recognition system.
Extensive experiments on various state-of-the-art face recognition mod-
els demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method on alleviating
the identity leakage of face images, without sacrificing the visual quality
of the protected images.
1 Introduction
The blooming development of social media and network has brought a huge
amount of personal data (e.g., photos) shared publicly. With the growing ubiq-
uity of deep neural networks, these techniques dramatically improve the capabili-
ties for an advanced face recognition system to deal with personal data [25,18,30,3],
but as a byproduct, also increase the potential risks for privacy leakage of
personal information. For example, an unauthorized third party may scrab-
ble and identify the shared photos on social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook,
LinkedIn,etc.) without the permission of their owners, resulting in cybercas-
ing [16]. Therefore, it is imperative to provide users an effective way to protect
their private information from being unconsciously identified and exposed by the
excessive unauthorized systems, without affecting users’ experience
The past years have witnessed the progress for privacy protection in both the
security and computer vision communities. Among the existing techniques, the
most studied category is based on image obfuscation. Conventional obfuscation
techniques [32], such as blurring, pixelation, darkening, and occlusion, are maybe
either perceptually satisfactory or effective against recognition systems [21,19].
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Fig. 1. An illustrative example of targeted identity protection. When users share pho-
tos on social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.), unauthorized applications
could scrabble their identities by searching for private websites or social media pro-
files based on face recognition systems, resulting in the privacy leakage of personal
information (e.g., name, phone number, address) tied to identity profiles. Therefore,
we provide an effective tool that allows users to conceal the identity information while
not affect the visual quality of their photos. Once exposed to the unauthorized face
systems, an image protected by the identity mask can conceal the corresponding iden-
tity by misleading the malicious systems to predict it as a wrong authorized or virtual
target, which could be provided by the service providers.
The recent advance in generative adversarial networks (GANs) [8] provides an
appealing way to generate more realistic images for obfuscation [27,28,33,17,7].
However, these methods are not problemless. First, the generated obfuscated
images have significantly different visual appearances compared with the original
images due to the exaggeration and suppression of some discriminative features,
and thus fail to preserve utility for users. Second, they occasionally generate
unnatural output images [28], which exhibit undesirable artifacts. Third, they
are only used to hide the personal identity against automatic recognition systems,
without the capability in specifying the target output identity. Fourth, compared
to model-based obfuscation method like GAN, our method is algorithm-based,
which is off-the-shelf for different data distributions.
Recent researches have found that face recognition systems are vulnerable
to adversarial examples [29,9,4,26,5], which can significantly change the out-
puts of a system by adding small perturbations. Although they pose security
threats to face recognition systems, it is an appealing way to apply an adver-
sarial perturbation to conceal one’s identity, even under a more strict constraint
of impersonating some authorized or generated face images when available (e.g.,
given by the social media services). It provides a possible solution to specify the
output, which may avoid an invasion of privacy to other persons if the resultant
image is recognized as an arbitrary identity. It should be noted that although the
adversarial perturbations generated by the existing methods have a small inten-
sity change (e.g., 12 or 16 for each pixel in [0, 255]), they may still sacrifice the
visual quality with artifacts [35], as illustrated in Fig. 2. Moreover, the current
adversarial attacks are mainly dependent on either the white-box control of the
target system [26,22] or the tremendous number of model queries [5], which are
Privacy Protection via TIP-IM 3
impractical in real-world scenarios (e.g., unauthorized face recognition systems
on social media) for privacy protection.
In this paper, we propose a practical targeted identity-protection at-
tack setting to alleviate the identity leakage of personal photos in real-world
social media. We focus on face identification in particular, the goal of which is
to identify a real face image in a unknown gallery identity set(see in Sec. 3),
since it can be adopted by unauthorized applications for recognizing the iden-
tity information of users. As stated in Fig. 1, privacy protection is to block the
ability of automatic inference on malicious applications, making them predict a
wrong authorized or virtual target by the service providers. Compared with the
conventional adversarial attack settings (e.g., dodging, impersonation), the pro-
posed targeted identity-protection setting is different yet more challenging. In
general, little is known about the face identification system and no direct query
access is possible. Therefore, we need to generate adversarial examples against a
surrogate white-box model with the purpose of deceiving a black-box face iden-
tification system. Moreover, we aim to not affect the user experience when users
share the protected photos on social media, meanwhile conceal their identities
from unauthorized identification systems. Thus, the adversarial examples should
also be visually natural from the corresponding original ones for human eyes,
otherwise undesirable artifacts may be introduced.
To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a targeted identity-
protection iterative method (TIP-IM) for privacy protection against black-
box face identification systems. The proposed method generates adversarial iden-
tity masks that are both transferable and imperceptible. A good transferabil-
ity can assure to effectively deceive other black-box face identification systems,
meanwhile the imperceptibility means that a photo manipulated by an adver-
sarial identity mask is visually natural for the human observers. Specifically, to
ensure the generated adversarial images are not arbitrarily misclassified as other
identities, we randomly choose a set of face images from a celebrity dataset col-
lected from the internet as the specified attack targets in our experiments1. Our
method is capable of finding a potential target from the chosen set of face images
with multiple identities via an optimization process, which makes the identity
protection easier compared with using only one single target.
We apply the proposed method to measure the success rate of identity protec-
tion against the current state-of-the-art face models, including Sphereface [18],
CosFace [30], FaceNet [25], ArcFace [3], MobileFace [2], and ResNet50 [11]. Ex-
tensive experiments conducted on the Labeled Face in the Wild (LFW) [12]
dataset and MegaFace Challenge [14] demonstrate its effectiveness under the
above setting. Our main contributions are summarized as
– We establish a practical identity protection setting to simulate identification
systems on the social media, which can provide a general understanding for
the current privacy protection.
1 We choose face images from the Internet only for experimental illustration. And our
algorithm is applicable for any authorized or generated target set of face images.
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Evasion
[32]
PP-GAN
[33]
Inpainting
[27]
Replacement
[28]
Eyeglasses
[26]
Evolutionary
[5]
GAMAN
[22]
Ours
Unknown
gallery set
No No No No No Yes No Yes
Target
identity
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Black-box
model
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes (Queries) No Yes
Natural
outputs
No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes
Same
faces
Partially Partially No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1. A comparison between different methods in terms of the unknown gallery set,
targeted misclassification of the output faces, black-box face models, natural output
faces, and whether the output faces are recognized as the same identities as the original
ones for human observers. Note that [5] considers the black-box face models with
queries, but our method does not rely on such information.
– We propose a targeted identity-protection iterative method (TIP-IM), which
enables to generate a natural protected image by adding an adversarial iden-
tity mask, providing a user a possible solution to automatically conceal one’s
identity without sacrificing the visual quality of photos significantly.
– Extensive experiments based on the state-of-the-art face recognition models
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method on alleviating identity
leakage of personal photos.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review related work on face privacy protection. We provide a
comprehensive comparison between the previous methods and ours in Table 1.
Privacy protection of face images. Several works have been developed
to protect private identity information in personal photos against face or person
recognition systems. Earlier works [32,24] study the performance of these sys-
tems under various simple image obfuscation methods, such as blurring, pixela-
tion, darkening, occlusion, etc. These methods have been shown to be ineffective
against the current recognition systems [21,19], since they can adapt to the ob-
fuscation patterns. More sophisticated techniques have been proposed thereafter.
For example, generative adversarial networks (GANs) [8] provide a useful way
to synthesize realistic images on the data distribution for image obfuscation [33].
In [27], the obfuscated images are generated by head in-painting conditioned on
the detected face landmarks. A following work [28] combines a parametric face
model with a GAN model for obtaining better performance. A recent work [17]
extends the previous works by balancing the utility and privacy of the generated
images. Privacy protection is also considered on videos [7]. However, the afore-
mentioned image obfuscation methods often change the visual appearances of
face images and even lead to unnatural outputs, limiting their utility for users.
Moreover, they cannot specify the target identities to be wrongly classified by
the face recognition models, which in some cases may violate the privacy of other
irrelevant persons. In this paper, we study adversarial examples as a powerful
obfuscation method for privacy protection.
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Adversarial attacks on face recognition. Deep neural networks are sus-
ceptible to adversarial examples [29,9,4], so are the face recognition models [26,5].
In previous works, the adversary can perform either dodging (i.e., recognized
wrongly) or impersonation (i.e., recognized as a target identity) attacks, based
on the white-box gradient information or the black-box model queries. A recent
work [22] proposes to adopt adversarial examples for privacy protection from a
game theory perspective. However, our work is significantly different from this
previous work in three aspects. First, we consider the open-set face identification
protocol [18] with an unknown gallery set, while [22] uses a closed-set scenario.
Second, we focus on the black-box attack setting, while [22] assumes the white-
box access to the target model. Third, we aim to generate natural adversarial
examples, while [22] does not consider the naturalness of adversarial examples.
3 Proposed Attack Setting for Privacy Protection
Let f(x) : X → Rd denote a face recognition model that extracts a fixed length
feature representation in Rd for an input face image x ∈ X ⊂ Rn. Given the
metric Df (x1,x2) = ‖f(x1) − f(x2)‖22 that measures the feature distance be-
tween two face images, face identification compares the distance between a probe
image and a gallery set of face images G = {xg1, ...,xgm}, and returns the identity
whose face image has the smallest feature distance with the probe image.
In this paper, we propose a novel yet practical attack setting called targeted
identity-protection attack to protect personal privacy against face identifi-
cation systems, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Specifically, to conceal the true identity
y of a face image xreal, we aim to generate an example xadv by adding an ad-
versarial identity mask to xreal, to make the face identification system predict
it as a different authorized identity or virtual identity corresponding to a gen-
erated image. Rather than specifying a single target identity for generating the
adversarial example, we manually choose an identity set I = {y1, ..., yk}, i.e.,
we allow the face identification system to recognize the adversarial example as
arbitrary one of the target identities in I rather than a single one, which makes
identity protection easier to achieve due to the relaxed constraints.
Formally, let Gy = {x|x ∈ G,O(x) = y} denote a subset of G containing all
face images belonging to the true identity y of xreal, with O being an oracle to
give the ground-truth identity labels, and GI =
⋃
1≤i≤k
Gyi denote the face images
belonging to the target identities of I in the gallery set G. To conceal the identity
of xreal, the adversarial example xadv should satisfy the constraint as
∃x′ ∈ GI ,∀x ∈ Gy : Df (xadv,x) > Df (xadv,x′). (1)
It ensures that the feature distance between the generated adversarial image
xadv and a target identity’s image x′ in GI is smaller than that between xadv
and any image belonging to the true identity y in Gy.
The proposed attack setting is designed for privacy protection of face images,
and is significantly different from the previous studied dodging and imperson-
ation attacks [26,22,5], in the following three aspects.
6 X.Yang et al.
Real Image ϵ = 12 ϵ = 16 Real Image ϵ = 12 ϵ = 16
Fig. 2. Illustration of different perturbations under the l∞ norm.
Naturalness. To make the adversarial example indistinguishable from the
corresponding original one, a common practice is to restrict the `p (p = 2,∞,
etc.) norm between the adversarial and original examples, as ‖xadv−xreal‖p ≤ .
However, the perturbation under the `p norm is still perceptible [35], as also
illustrated in Fig. 2. Therefore, we further require that the adversarial example
should look natural besides the constraint of the `p norm bound, to make it really
imperceptible for human eyes, which is not considered in previous works. We
use an objective function to promote the naturalness of the adversarial example,
which will be specified in Sec. 4.1.
Unawareness of gallery set. For a real-world face identification system,
we have no knowledge of its gallery set G, meaning that we are not able to solve
Eq. (1) directly, while previous works assume the availability of the gallery set or
a closed-set protocol (i.e., no gallery set). To address this issue, we use substitute
face images for optimization. In particular, we collect an image set GˆI containing
face images that belong to the target identities of I as a surrogate for GI ; and
use {xreal} directly instead of Gy. The rationality of using substitute images is
that face representations of one identity are similar, and thus the representation
of an adversarial example optimized to be similar to the substitutes can also be
close to images belonging to the same target identity in the gallery set.
Black-box attack. In practice, we are also unaware of the face identification
model, include its architecture, parameters, and gradients. Previous methods rely
on either the white-box access to the target model or the tremendous number
of queries, which are impractical in real-world scenarios for privacy protection.
Therefore, we adopt a surrogate white-box model against which the adversarial
examples are generated, with the purpose of attacking black-box models based
on the transferability of adversarial example [23,4].
In summary, our setting is designed to simulate the real-world scenarios with
minimum assumptions of the target face identification system, which is also more
challenging than previously studied settings.
4 Methodology
To achieve the above requirements, we propose a targeted identity-protection
iterative method (TIP-IM) to generate adversarial examples in this section.
4.1 Problem Formulation
To generate an adversarial example xadv that is both effective for obfuscation
against face identification systems and visually natural for human eyes, we for-
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malize the objective of targeted privacy-protection attack as
min
xadv
{
min
x′∈GˆI
Jiden(x′,xadv) + γ · Jnat(xadv)
}
, s.t. ‖xadv − xreal‖p ≤ , (2)
where Jiden is an identification loss that makes the face identification model
recognize xadv as the target identity of x′, Jnat promotes xadv to look natural,
and γ is a hyperparameter to balance these two losses. We also restrict the
`p norm of the adversarial perturbation to be smaller than a constant . Note
that for the unawareness of gallery set, we use the substitute face images GˆI in
our objective (2); for the black-box model, we generate an adversarial example
xadv against a surrogate white-box model with the purpose of fooling the black-
box model based on the transferability. Thus the requirements in the proposed
targeted identity-protection attack can be fulfilled by solving Eq. (2).
The inner minimization min
x′∈GˆI
Jiden of Eq. (2) aims to find the best target
image in GˆI such that the identification loss is minimized w.r.t. x′. We define
Jiden as
Jiden(x′,xadv) = Df (xadv,x′)−Df (xadv,xreal). (3)
By minimizing Jiden as in Eq. (2), we actually minimize the feature distance
between the adversarial example xadv and a face image x′ in GˆI , while maximize
the feature distance between the adversarial and original images. Thus the inner
minimization of Eq. (2) corresponds to finding x′ ∈ GˆI such that the adversarial
example xadv has the smallest distance to x′ in the feature space.
Although the perturbation is somewhat small due to the `p norm constraint
in Eq. (2), it can be still perceptible and not natural for human eyes, as shown
in Fig. 2. Therefore, we add a loss Jnat into our objective to explicitly encourage
the naturalness of the generated adversarial example. In this paper, we adopt the
maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) [1] as Jnat, because it is an effective non-
parametric and differentiable metric capable of comparing two data distributions
and evaluating the imperceptibility of the generated images. In our case, given
two sets of data Xadv = {xadv1 , ...,xadvN } and Xreal = {xreal1 , ...,xrealN } comprised
of N adversarial and N real examples, MMD calculates their discrepancy by
MMD(Xadv,Xreal) =
∣∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(xadvi )− 1
N
N∑
j=1
φ(xrealj )
∣∣∣∣2
H, (4)
where φ(·) maps the data to a reproducing kernel Hilbert space (RKHS) [1].
We adopt the same φ(·) as in [1]. By minimizing MMD between the samples
Xadv from the adversarial distribution and the samples Xreal from the real data
distribution, we can enforce Xadv to lie on the real data distribution, meaning
the adversarial examples in Xadv will be as natural as real examples.
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Since MMD is defined on the batches of images, we thus rewrite our objec-
tive (2) with a batch-based formulation2 as
min
Xadv
{ 1
N
N∑
i=1
min
x′i∈GˆI
Jiden(x′i,xadvi ) + γ ·MMD(Xadv,Xreal)
}
,
s.t. xadvi ∈ Xadv,xreali ∈ Xreal : ‖xadvi − xreali ‖p ≤ .
(5)
Considering the complexity of solving the bi-level optimization problem (5),
we first introduce the iterative algorithm if the solution of inner minimization is
given, and then detail how to solve the inner minimization.
4.2 Targeted Identity-Protection Iterative Method
When there is only one target face image in GˆI , we do not need to solve the
inner minimization problem in Eq. (5), and the outer minimization problem can
be effectively solved by various iterative gradient-based attack methods [15,4].
So in this section, we assume that we already obtain the solution of the inner
problem, and introduce the targeted identity-protection iterative method (TIP-
IM) to generate adversarial examples by solving the outer problem. We defer to
Sec. 4.3 on how to solve the inner problem via a greedy insertion algorithm.
Given the solution x′i
∗
of the inner problem, We let J (Xadv) denote the
overall loss function as
J (Xadv) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
Jiden(x′i∗,xadvi ) + γ ·MMD(Xadv,Xreal). (6)
We can therefore generate the batch of adversarial examples Xadv by minimiz-
ing J (Xadv). Given the definitions of Jiden and MMD in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4),
J (Xadv) is a differentiable function w.r.t. Xadv, and thus we can adopt iterative
gradient-based attack methods to generate adversarial examples. In particular,
we optimize Xadv via
Xadvt+1 = Π{Xreal,`p,}
(
Xadvt − α ·Normalize(∇XJ (Xadvt ))
)
, (7)
where Xadvt is the batch of adversarial examples at the t-th iteration, α is the step
size, Π is the projection function that projects the adversarial examples onto the
`p norm bound, and Normalize(·) is used to normalize the gradient (e.g., a sign
function under the `∞ norm bound or the `2 normalization under the `2 norm
bound). We perform the iterative process for a total number of T iterations and
get the final adversarial examples as XadvT . To prevent adversarial examples from
falling into local minima and improve their transferability for other black-box
face identification models, we incorporate the momentum technique [4] into the
iterative process.
2 In case of there is only one single image or a small number of images, we can augment
the images with multiple transformations to make up a large batch, with the results
shown in Appendix C.
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Algorithm 1: Inner Minimization via Greedy Insertion
Input: The attack objective function Jiden from Eq. (3); a real face xreal and a
multi-identity face images GˆI ; a feature representation function f ; a
gain function G.
Input: The adversarial example xadv generated before the current iteration.
Output: The best target image x′∗ in GˆI .
1 gbest ← 0; x′∗ ← None;
2 for x′ in GˆI do
3 Get the loss Jiden(x′,xadv) via Eq. (3);
4 Compute the gradient ∇xJiden(x′,xadv);
5 Generate candidate adversarial example
xˆadv = Π{xreal,`p,}(x
adv − α ·Normalize(∇xJiden(x′,xadv)));
6 Calculate g = G(xˆadv);
7 if g > gbest then
8 gbest ← g; x′∗ ← x′;
9 end
10 end
4.3 Inner Minimization via Greedy Insertion
The target set GˆI containing multiple identities offers more potential optimiza-
tion directions to get better performance. Therefore, we aim to develop an opti-
mization algorithm to solve the inner minimization problem min
x′∈GˆI
Jiden(x′,xadv),
where we omit the index i in Eq. (5) for clarity. For the iterative procedure in
Eq. (7) with T iterations, we need to select a representative target for each ad-
versarial example in GˆI at each iteration for updates, which belongs to a subset
selection problem.
Definition 1. Let St denote the set of the selected targets from GˆI at each
iteration until the t-th iteration. Let F denote a set mapping function that outputs
a gain value (larger is better) in R for a set. For x′ ∈ GˆI , we define ∆(x′|St) =
F (St ∪ {x′})− F (St) be the marginal gain of F at St given x′.
Formally, as the iteration gets increasing in the iteration loop, if the marginal
gain decreases monotonically, then F will belong to the family of submodular
functions [36]. For a submodular problem, a greedy algorithm can be used to
find an approximate solution, and it has been shown that submodularity will
have a (1 − 1/e)-approximation [20] for monotinely submodular functions. Al-
though our iterative identity-protection setting is not guaranteed to be strictly
submodular, the solution based on greedy insertion still plays a quite obvious
role, even if submodularity is not strictly decreased [36,6]. Therefore, we adopt
the greedy insertion solution as an approximately optimal solution for our multi-
target problem.
By analyzing the above setting, we perform the approximate submodular
optimization by greedy insertion algorithm, which calculates the gain of every
object from the target set at each iteration and integrates the object with the
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largest gain into current subset St by Definition 1 as
St+1 = St ∪ {arg max
x′∈GˆI
∆(x′|St)}. (8)
To achieve this, we need to define the above set mapping function F . In particu-
lar, we specify F as first generating an adversarial sample xadv given the targets
in St for t iterations via Eq. (7), and then using a function G to compute a gain
value by Definition 1. An appropriate gain function G should choose examples
that are effective for minimizing Jiden(x′,xadv) at each iteration. It is noted that
G must also have positive value and a larger value indicates better performance.
Based on this analysis, we design a feature-based similarity gain function as
G(xadv) = log
(
1 + max
x′∈GˆI
exp(Df (xadv,xreal)−Df (xadv,x′))
)
, (9)
where the algorithm tends to select a target closer to the real image in the
feature space at each iteration, which also accords with Eq. (3). The algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
5 Experiments
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments in the aspect of identity pro-
tection to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. We thoroughly
evaluate different properties of our method based on various state-of-the-art face
recognition models under the targeted identity-protection setting.
5.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. The experiments are constructed on the Labeled Face in the Wild
(LFW) [12] and MegFace [14] datasets. In each dataset, we first select 500 dif-
ferent identities as the protected identities. Meanwhile, we randomly select an
image from each identity as the probe image (total 500 images), and the other
images for each identity are assembled to form a gallery set. We randomly select
another 10 identities as I. We collect their face images from a celebrity dataset
named MS-Celeb-1M [10]. We select one image for each of these target identities
to form GˆI , while the remaining images are integrated into the gallery set. Be-
sides, by considering the open-set face identification protocol, we add additional
500 identities to the gallery set, which also accords with the realistic scenario.
We hope that the protected images given by TIP-IM can confuse black-box face
identification models for the purpose of identity protection.
Target models. We select sphereface [18], CosFace [30], FaceNet [25], Arc-
Face [3], MobileFace [2], and ResNet50 [11] as the fundamental face recognition
models. Note that these models lie in various settings, including different model
architectures and training objectives. For each image in the dataset, We first
use MTCNN [34] to detect faces, then we align the images and crop them to
112 × 112, meaning that the identity masks are executed only in the face area.
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In experiments, we only use one white-box model to generate the identity masks
and test the performance against the other black-box models.
Compared Methods. We investigate many privacy protection methods [26,22,5],
but few attempts have been made for black-box models and targeted privacy
protection. Therefore, we incorporate several baselines. The first is TIP-IM with
only one single target in Eq. (5). Besides, we demonstrate the influence of dif-
ferent gain functions for multi-targets optimization. We denote the additional
gain functions based on Eq. (9) as G1(x) = log
(
1 +
∑
x′∈GˆI exp(Df (x,xreal)−
Df (x,x′))
)
and G2(x) = log
(
1+ min
x′∈GˆI
exp(Df (x,xreal)−Df (x,x′))
)
, which are
named TIP-IM-G1 and TIP-TM-G2. TIP-IM-G1 promotes adversarial samples
to be updated towards the mean center of target identities in the feature space,
whereas TIP-IM-G2 seeks for the farthest target with current object constantly.
Moreover, we denote TIP-IM-Rand as a random search method for solving the
inner minimization as a comparison. We set the number of iterations as N = 50,
the learning rate α = 1.5 and the size of perturbation  = 12 under the `∞ norm
bound, which are identical for all the experiments.
Evaluation Metrics. To evaluate the protection success rate of identity-
protection attack, we report Rank-N targeted identity success rate named Rank-
N-T and untargeted identity success rate named Rank-N-UT (higher is better).
Specifically, given a probe image x and a gallery set G with at least one image
of the same identity with x, meanwhile G has images of target identities. The
face identification algorithm ranks the distance Df for all images in the gallery
to x. Rank-N-T means that at least one of the top N images belongs to the
target identity, whereas Rank-N-UT needs to satisfy that top N images do not
have the same identity as x. In this paper, we report Rank-1-T, Rank-5-T,
Rank-1-UT, and Rank-5-UT. To test the imperceptibility of the generated
protected images, we adopt the standard quantitative measures—PSNR (dB)
and structural similarity (SSIM) [31], as well as MMD. For SSIM and PSNR, a
larger value means better image quality, whereas a smaller MMD value indicates
superior performance.
5.2 Black-box Identity Protection
In this section, we report the results on the LFW dataset. Due to the space lim-
itation, we leave the results of MegFace in Appendix B. We generate adversarial
examples against CosFace, ArcFace, MobileFace, and ResNet50 respectively, by
the proposed TIP-IM. We then feed the generated adversarial examples to all
face models for white-box/black-box tests, as shown in Table 4. Our algorithm
achieves the best performance in terms of Rank-1-T and Rand-5-T, and out-
performs other methods by a large margin. Note that the Single-Target method
obtains acceptable performance against white-box models, but is completely in-
ferior to multi-target methods against black-box models. The main reason is
that more targets provide more promising directions, making generated adver-
sarial examples more effective for black-box models. Therefore, the adversarial
examples from multi-targets are essential in exploring identity protection tasks.
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Attack
CosFace ArcFace MobileFace ResNet50 SphereFace FaceNet
R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T
C
o
sF
A
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
45.8∗
7.0∗
8.2∗
6.6∗
61.6∗
70.2∗
21.6∗
26.6∗
19.4∗
85.2∗
5.8
6.0
7.8
7.8
31.0
25.6
26.4
31.6
21.8
62.6
7.6
12.0
14.4
13.2
48.8
35.3
42.8
44.4
38.0
77.8
6.0
9.0
11.6
9.8
39.8
29.8
34.0
41.0
34.8
67.2
10.2
9.2
8.8
7.0
22.6
32.0
21.4
26.0
23.4
48.2
6.4
8.6
8.0
6.4
33.0
23.2
27.2
30.4
24.4
57.0
A
rc
F
a
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
2.6
2.0
3.8
1.6
11.4
11.0
11.2
13.0
8.6
31.0
94.8∗
34.8∗
59.4∗
39.0∗
97.2∗
97.6∗
68.2∗
84.6∗
70.6∗
98.8∗
16.8
18.8
36.8
22.8
69.8
48.0
53.6
66.0
55.4
90.6
10.8
15.8
28.8
17.2
56.0
34.8
46.0
57.6
47.4
80.6
4.2
3.8
6.6
5.8
13.2
15.6
18.4
21.4
20.0
32.0
4.4
9.6
11.8
9.0
32.8
19.0
33.6
35.4
30.4
56.2
M
o
b
il
e
F
a
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
1.2
2.0
3.6
1.4
12.4
5.2
11.0
12.4
11.2
31.2
9.4
10.6
14.8
8.4
44.0
28.8
30.2
41.8
32.6
68.2
96.6∗
40.2∗
53.0∗
30.2∗
96.6∗
98.4∗
73.2∗
83.4∗
68.4∗
99.2∗
28.8
18.6
21.8
16.8
62.8
63.2
49.4
53.6
44.2
85.8
6.2
6.8
5.8
5.4
12.6
19.2
22.2
25.6
19.8
29.8
4.8
9.8
12.2
8.0
28.8
20.6
27.0
29.6
22.2
46.2
R
e
sN
e
t5
0 Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
2.0
1.8
2.4
1.6
10.8
6.6
8.8
12.0
9.8
26.2
7.0
14.2
13.2
8.8
34.2
26.4
37.6
37.14
31.2
56.8
26.6
22.4
26.8
20.6
62.4
57.2
52.6
58.6
49.0
83.4
31.4∗
31.4∗
41.6∗
21.4∗
95.6∗
65.0∗
65.0∗
73.4∗
56.8∗
98.2∗
9.2
5.2
6.8
3.2
11.4
24.2
16.8
21.0
16.8
25.6
6.8
9.4
9.2
7.8
23.2
22.8
29.2
27.2
27.2
40.0
Table 2. Rank-1-T and Rank-5-T (%) of black-box privacy protection against CosFace,
SphereFace, FaceNet, ArcFace, MobileFace, and ResNet. ∗ indicates white-box results.
Metric γ=0 γ=0.2 γ=0.4 γ=0.6
CosFace
PSNR
SSIM
MMD
25.26
0.6497
0.7569
25.34
0.6562
0.7567
25.60
0.6764
0.7563
26.73
0.7389
0.7541
ArcFace
PSNR
SSIM
MMD
25.26
0.6520
0.7567
25.59
0.6690
0.7562
26.08
0.6986
0.7554
27.63
0.7817
0.7518
MobileFace
PSNR
SSIM
MMD
25.24
0.6490
0.7567
25.18
0.6523
0.7568
25.72
0.6828
0.7559
27.19
0.7533
0.7525
ResNet50
PSNR
SSIM
MMD
25.14
0.6507
0.7570
25.26
0.6595
0.7567
25.74
0.6897
0.7558
27.21
0.760
0.7525
Table 3. The average PSNR (db), SSIM, and MMD of the protected images generated
by TIP-IM with different γ for each face model.
We report the results of Rank-5-UT in Appendix A, which demonstrates that it
can still maintain an average accuracy over 70% for black-box models.
Ablation Study. As shown in Table 4, it can be also observed that different
gain functions extremely influence the performance, which means that an appro-
priate gain function is important to achieve good black-box performance. Among
different gain functions, the original one defined in Eq. (9) achieves the best per-
formance, meaning that an effective method is that we select the closest target
in the feature space as the update direction. Note that the adversarial examples
generated against MobileFace have excellent transferability to the other black-
box models. This observation might be explained that the simple convolutional
structure of networks can obtain more universal features.
Comparison experiments about target images. We test the perfor-
mance of different numbers of targets in Appendix D, which implies that appro-
priate increases in the number of targets is beneficial to performance improve-
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= 0.000 = 0.035 = 0.040 = 0.045 = 0.050 = 0.055 = 0.060
 


  


Naturalness
γγ γ γ γ γ γ
Fig. 3. Experiments on how different γ affects the performance of adversarial samples.
Green hook refers to successful targeted identity protection while red hook refers to
failure, which also implies a trade-off on effectiveness and naturalnes.
ment against black-box models. We specify some generated images from Style-
GAN [13] as target images. The results in Appendix D show that our algorithm
still has excellent black-box performance of identity protection. In practical ap-
plications, we can arbitrarily specify the available and authorized target identity
set or generated face images, and our algorithm is applicable to any target set.
5.3 Naturalness
To examine whether our algorithm is able to control the naturalness of adversar-
ial examples in the process of generating the samples, we perform experiments
with different coefficient γ. Table 3 shows the evaluation results of different face
identification models (including CosFace, ArcFace, MobileFace, and ResNet50)
in terms of three different metrics—PSNR, SSIM, and MMD. As the coefficient
γ increases, the visual quality of the generated images is getting better based on
different metrics, which is also consistent with the example in Fig. 3. Therefore,
conditioned on different γ, we can control the degree of the generated adversarial
images.
5.4 Trade-off between Effectiveness and Naturalness
Apart from quantitative measures, we also performed naturalness manipulation
for different coefficient γ dynamically, as illustrated in Fig. 3. It can be seen that
the image looks more natural as the γ increases, whereas to a certain extent
identity protection tends to fail, meaning that there exists a trade-off between
black-box obfuscation effectiveness and naturalness. Therefore, we also perform
a more comprehensive evaluation on all given identity recognition models in
Fig. 4. We study the effect of different coefficients γ on the success rate of
attacks. Four face identification models including CosFace, ArcFace, MobileFace,
and Resnet50 have similar trends. As the coefficient γ increases, naturalness
assessment indicators SSIM are also rising, but there exists a general downward
trend for Rank-1-T accuracy. Notably that Rank-1-T rises first and then falls,
meaning that appropriate γ can make transferbility more effective. In practical
14 X.Yang et al.
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Fig. 4. Rank-1-T score and SSIM of adversarial examples generated by TIP-IM with
different γ against CosFace, SphereFace, FaceNet, ArcFace, MobileFace, and ResNet50.
applications, users can adjust γ to control stronger obfuscation performance
(effectiveness) or visual quality (naturalness).
5.5 Privacy Protection on a Real-World Application
In this section, we apply our proposed TIP-IM to test the privacy protection
performance on a commercial face search API available at Tencent AI Open
Platform3. The working mechanism is completely unknown for us. To simulate
the privacy data scenario, we use the same gallery set with over 6, 000 images
and 1, 000 identities (including 10 target identities) described above. We choose
20 probe faces from above probe set to execute face search based on similarity
ranking in this platform. All 20 probe faces can be identified at rank1. Then
we generate corresponding protected images from probe faces to execute face
search.For return rankings there exists 6 target identities in rank1 and 16 in
rank5. Note that Faces with the same identity also show a decreasing similarity
in different degrees, which also illustrates the effectiveness for black-box face
system, and two examples are shown in Fig. 5.
Face Search in Practical SystemFace Search in Practical System
Real Face
Protected Face
94 90 89 97 80 80
87 80 77 88 81 81
Real Face
Protected Face
Fig. 5. Examples of privacy protection on the real-world face recognition API. We
separately use real and protected faces by TIP-IM as probes to do face search and show
top three results by similarity. Blue boxes represent the faces with same identities as
probe faces and green boxes imply the faces belonging to targeted identities. Similarity
scores with probe face are marked in yellow.
3 https://ai.qq.com/product/face.shtml
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of identity protection by simulating realis-
tic identification systems in the social media. A practical setting called targeted
identity-protection and a novel targeted identity-protection iterative method
(TIP-IM) are introduced, which enable users to protect their private informa-
tion from being exposed by the unauthorized identification systems while not
affecting the user experience in social media. Extensive experiments based on
the state-of-the-art face recognition models demonstrate that our algorithm can
effectively alleviate the identity leakage of face images.
A Additional Evaluation Results on LFW.
We report the results of Rank-1-UT and Rank-5-UT on LFW dataset in Tab. 4.
Different multi-target methods are not much different in the aspect of untargeted
ranking, yet excel the single-target method.
Attack
CosFace ArcFace MobileFace ResNet50 SphereFace FaceNet
R1-U R5-U R1-U R5-U R1-U R5-U R1-U R5-U R1-U R5-U R1-U R5-U
C
o
sF
A
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
95.0∗
96.6∗
95.8∗
95.4∗
96.6∗
93.4∗
94.6∗
95.4∗
95.5∗
95.4∗
44.8
52.8
55.8
54.6
54.2
30.8
42.4
42.8
43.0
39.4
56.2
65.0
66.0
65.6
64.8
45.0
52.4
54.8
53.0
51.2
46.6
55.0
57.2
57.2
57.2
37.8
45.8
46.6
46.2
44.2
88.8
92.2
91.4
91.6
89.0
81.2
88.2
86.2
86.2
84.0
68.0
78.2
75.6
76.0
73.6
52.8
63.8
63.8
66.0
61.2
A
rc
F
a
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
74.2
80.0
82.0
84.0
74.0
62.8
72.2
72.8
73.0
63.8
95.8∗
96.0∗
96.0∗
95.6∗
97.4∗
91.8∗
93.6∗
95.2∗
93.4∗
96.4∗
67.6
73.6
79.0
73.0
79.4
58.2
65.2
70.0
65.2
68.8
58.2
64.8
68.2
63.4
70.4
48.0
54.2
59.0
55.4
56.8
79.6
82.8
85.2
83.8
78.6
68.2
73.0
76.6
74.0
68.4
67.4
73.0
73.4
73.6
70.0
53.6
60.0
63.4
60.8
57.8
M
o
b
il
e
F
a
c
e Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
75.6
79.4
80.0
79.4
74.4
62.2
67.0
67.8
68.2
61.2
60.2
67.2
67.4
66.4
68.6
45.4
55.4
58.0
57.4
52.8
96.6∗
95.4∗
95.0∗
95.2∗
96.6∗
92.0∗
93.6∗
93.6∗
94.6∗
94.8∗
72.2
77.6
80.8
80.0
81.4
59.0
68.4
73.8
71.4
71.2
80.0
83.2
84.4
84.4
78.6
69.6
73.2
74.6
74.0
65.0
68.4
74.6
77.0
77.6
75.0
53.6
60.6
62.0
60.4
58.6
R
e
sN
e
t5
0 Single-Target
TIP-IM-Rand
TIP-IM-G1
TIP-IM-G2
TIP-IM
77.6
83.0
82.8
83.6
77.0
64.2
71.8
72.4
73.0
65.8
61.8
73.2
70.0
71.6
68.0
50.4
59.0
59.6
58.4
54.6
80.6
84.8
87.0
85.2
85.4
72.2
78.2
81.8
77.4
77.4
95.4∗
95.0∗
95.8∗
95.4∗
96.8∗
91.6∗
93.8∗
94.8∗
92.8∗
94.6∗
80.4
83.2
85.8
84.0
77.6
65.8
74.4
75.0
74.2
65.4
69.0
79.4
78.8
77.4
72.6
53.2
63.8
65.0
65.4
60.8
Table 4. Rank-1-UT and Rank-5-UT (%) of black-box attacks against CosFace,
SphereFace,FaceNet, ArcFace, MobileFace, ResNet. ∗ indicates white-box attacks.
B Evaluation Results on MegFace.
We report the results on the MegFace dataset in Tab. 5. Compared with LFW,
MegFace has more gallery images, resulting in more difficult identity protection
on the whole.
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Attack
CosFace ArcFace MobileFace ResNet50 SphereFace FaceNet
R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T R1-T R5-T
CosFace
Single-target
TIP-IM
9.0∗
39.0∗
20.8∗
61.2∗
3.6
30.4
16.0
53.2
7.4
42.6
24.6
65.8
4.8
34.6
19.0
55.4
1.4
7.8
11.0
24.4
4.8
25.0
14.8
48.6
ArcFace
Single-target
TIP-IM
1.4
8.6
7.6
22.4
92.0∗
97.0∗
97.0∗
98.2∗
11.6
60.2
36.0
81.2
8.0
51.0
23.4
67.8
1.6
4.6
7.6
16.4
3.4
24.8
13.4
43.0
MobileFace
Single-target
TIP-IM
2.0
8.0
9.2
19.4
5.8
37.0
19.4
57.6
94.8∗
97.2∗
96.4∗
97.6∗
18.6
52.8
42.0
73.2
2.8
3.2
9.6
12.4
4.0
18.0
14.2
34.8
ResNet50
Single-target
TIP-IM
3.2
7.2
9.2
22.0
7.8
29.0
19.0
44.8
15.2
56.6
44.2
76.8
91.4∗
92.2∗
95.4∗
97.0∗
2.6
2.4
13.0
13.8
4.8
18.4
16.8
32.0
Table 5. Rank-1-T and Rank-5-T (%) of black-box attacks against CosFace,
SphereFace,FaceNet, ArcFace, MobileFace, ResNet on MegFace. ∗ indicates white-box
attacks.
C Batch Analysis on MMD Optimization.
Tab. 6 shows results on different batch sizes w.r.t naturalness. It can be seen that
the evaluation of visual quality becomes stable as the batch size exceeds 50. We
set batch size as 50 in this paper. For single image crafting, we have two choices.
The first one is self augmentation including rotation, projective, brightness and
transformations; The second one is collecting some irrelevant images to form a
batch just for optimal results in the phase of MMD optimization.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
SSIM 0.8518 0.8392 0.7592 0.7021 0.6759 0.6765 0.6633 0.6649 0.6674
PSNR(dB) 28.71 28.55 26.95 26.02 25.55 25.63 25.40 25.50 25.54
Table 6. The mean PSNR (db) and SSIM for different batch sizes based on CosFace.
D Comparison Experiments about Target Images.
Different numbers of targets. As illustrated in Fig. 6, we study the effect of
different numbers on the black-box identity protection. The curve first rises and
finally approaches the steady. Therefore, appropriate increases in the number of
targets is beneficial to performance improvement against black-box models.
Generated images as targets. To further verify that our algorithm does
not depend on the selection of targets, we specify some generated images from
StyleGAN [13] as target images, which is illustrated as Fig. 7. We use these
generated images as target images and set the same other setting with above
experiments. Tab. 7 shows Rank-1-T, Rand-1-UT, Rank-5-T and Rank-5-UT
of black-box attacks against CosFace,SphereFace,FaceNet, ArcFace, MobileFace
and ResNet. The results show that our algorithm still has excellent black-box
performance of identity protection. In practical applications, we can arbitrarily
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Fig. 6. The perturbation vs. numbers of targets curve of face identification models
against black-box identity protection. MobileFace is a surrogate white-box model.
specify the available and authorised target identity set or some generated facial
images, and our algorithm is applicable to any target set.
Fig. 7. Examples of some generated images from StyleGAN [13].
CosFace ArcFace MobileFace ResNet50 SphereFace FaceNet
Rank-1-T 49.6 12.2 32.4 29.2 27.4 28.2
Rank-5-T 70.0 30.4 52.2 54.8 56.4 53.8
Rank-1-UT 95.0 89.0 73.8 49.6 60.8 54.2
Rank-5-UT 93.6 82.0 55.8 31.6 41.8 34.8
Table 7. Results of black-box attacks against CosFace, SphereFace,FaceNet, ArcFace,
MobileFace, ResNet when treating the generated images as the target images. CosFace
is used as substitute model.
References
1. Borgwardt, K.M., Gretton, A., Rasch, M.J., Kriegel, H.P., Scho¨lkopf, B., Smola,
A.J.: Integrating structured biological data by kernel maximum mean discrepancy.
Bioinformatics 22(14), e49–e57 (2006)
2. Chen, S., Liu, Y., Gao, X., Han, Z.: Mobilefacenets: Efficient cnns for accurate
real-time face verification on mobile devices. In: Chinese Conference on Biometric
Recognition. pp. 428–438. Springer (2018)
18 X.Yang et al.
3. Deng, J., Guo, J., Xue, N., Zafeiriou, S.: Arcface: Additive angular margin loss
for deep face recognition. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 4690–4699 (2019)
4. Dong, Y., Liao, F., Pang, T., Su, H., Zhu, J., Hu, X., Li, J.: Boosting adversarial
attacks with momentum. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2018)
5. Dong, Y., Su, H., Wu, B., Li, Z., Liu, W., Zhang, T., Zhu, J.: Efficient decision-
based black-box adversarial attacks on face recognition. In: Proceedings of the
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) (2019)
6. Feige, U., Mirrokni, V.S., Vondra´k, J.: Maximizing non-monotone submodular
functions. SIAM Journal on Computing 40(4), 1133–1153 (2011)
7. Gafni, O., Wolf, L., Taigman, Y.: Live face de-identification in video. In: Proceed-
ings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision. pp. 9378–9387
(2019)
8. Goodfellow, I., Pouget-Abadie, J., Mirza, M., Xu, B., Warde-Farley, D., Ozair,
S., Courville, A., Bengio, Y.: Generative adversarial nets. In: Advances in neural
information processing systems. pp. 2672–2680 (2014)
9. Goodfellow, I.J., Shlens, J., Szegedy, C.: Explaining and harnessing adversarial
examples. In: International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) (2015)
10. Guo, Y., Zhang, L., Hu, Y., He, X., Gao, J.: Ms-celeb-1m: A dataset and benchmark
for large-scale face recognition. In: European Conference on Computer Vision. pp.
87–102. Springer (2016)
11. He, K., Zhang, X., Ren, S., Sun, J.: Identity mappings in deep residual networks. In:
European Conference on Computer Vision (ECCV). pp. 630–645. Springer (2016)
12. Huang, G.B., Mattar, M., Berg, T., Learned-Miller, E.: Labeled faces in the wild:
A database forstudying face recognition in unconstrained environments (2008)
13. Karras, T., Laine, S., Aittala, M., Hellsten, J., Lehtinen, J., Aila, T.: Analyzing
and improving the image quality of StyleGAN
14. Kemelmacher-Shlizerman, I., Seitz, S.M., Miller, D., Brossard, E.: The megaface
benchmark: 1 million faces for recognition at scale. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 4873–4882 (2016)
15. Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I., Bengio, S.: Adversarial examples in the physical
world. In: International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) Work-
shops (2017)
16. Larson, M., Liu, Z., Brugman, S., Zhao, Z.: Pixel privacy. increasing image appeal
while blocking automatic inference of sensitive scene information (2018)
17. Li, T., Lin, L.: Anonymousnet: Natural face de-identification with measurable pri-
vacy. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition Workshops. pp. 0–0 (2019)
18. Liu, W., Wen, Y., Yu, Z., Li, M., Raj, B., Song, L.: Sphereface: Deep hypersphere
embedding for face recognition. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on com-
puter vision and pattern recognition. pp. 212–220 (2017)
19. McPherson, R., Shokri, R., Shmatikov, V.: Defeating image obfuscation with deep
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.00408 (2016)
20. Nemhauser, G.L., Wolsey, L.A., Fisher, M.L.: An analysis of approximations for
maximizing submodular set functionsi. Mathematical programming 14(1), 265–294
(1978)
21. Oh, S.J., Benenson, R., Fritz, M., Schiele, B.: Faceless person recognition: Privacy
implications in social media. In: European Conference on Computer Vision. pp.
19–35. Springer (2016)
Privacy Protection via TIP-IM 19
22. Oh, S.J., Fritz, M., Schiele, B.: Adversarial image perturbation for privacy pro-
tection a game theory perspective. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on
Computer Vision (ICCV). pp. 1491–1500. IEEE (2017)
23. Papernot, N., McDaniel, P., Goodfellow, I., Jha, S., Celik, Z.B., Swami, A.: Prac-
tical black-box attacks against deep learning systems using adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1602.02697 (2016)
24. Ribaric, S., Ariyaeeinia, A., Pavesic, N.: De-identification for privacy protection
in multimedia content: A survey. Signal Processing: Image Communication 47,
131–151 (2016)
25. Schroff, F., Kalenichenko, D., Philbin, J.: Facenet: A unified embedding for face
recognition and clustering. In: Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer
vision and pattern recognition. pp. 815–823 (2015)
26. Sharif, M., Bhagavatula, S., Bauer, L., Reiter, M.K.: Accessorize to a crime: Real
and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In: ACM Sigsac Confer-
ence on Computer and Communications Security. pp. 1528–1540 (2016)
27. Sun, Q., Ma, L., Joon Oh, S., Van Gool, L., Schiele, B., Fritz, M.: Natural and
effective obfuscation by head inpainting. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 5050–5059 (2018)
28. Sun, Q., Tewari, A., Xu, W., Fritz, M., Theobalt, C., Schiele, B.: A hybrid model
for identity obfuscation by face replacement. In: Proceedings of the European Con-
ference on Computer Vision (ECCV). pp. 553–569 (2018)
29. Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I.,
Fergus, R.: Intriguing properties of neural networks. In: International Conference
on Learning Representations (ICLR) (2014)
30. Wang, H., Wang, Y., Zhou, Z., Ji, X., Gong, D., Zhou, J., Li, Z., Liu, W.: Cosface:
Large margin cosine loss for deep face recognition. In: Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. pp. 5265–5274 (2018)
31. Wang, Z., Bovik, A.C., Sheikh, H.R., Simoncelli, E.P., et al.: Image quality as-
sessment: from error visibility to structural similarity. IEEE transactions on image
processing 13(4), 600–612 (2004)
32. Wilber, M.J., Shmatikov, V., Belongie, S.: Can we still avoid automatic face de-
tection? In: 2016 IEEE Winter Conference on Applications of Computer Vision
(WACV). pp. 1–9. IEEE (2016)
33. Wu, Y., Yang, F., Ling, H.: Privacy-protective-gan for face de-identification. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1806.08906 (2018)
34. Zhang, K., Zhang, Z., Li, Z., Qiao, Y.: Joint face detection and alignment using
multitask cascaded convolutional networks. IEEE Signal Processing Letters 23(10),
1499–1503 (2016)
35. Zhao, Z., Dua, D., Singh, S.: Generating natural adversarial examples. In: Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) (2018)
36. Zhou, Y., Spanos, C.J.: Causal meets submodular: Subset selection with directed
information. In: Advances In Neural Information Processing Systems. pp. 2649–
2657 (2016)
